[1] Arbitration is an adjunct of a bargaining system that has been shaped by the compulsion of law. Furthermore, both the courts and national and state legislatures have endorsed arbitration; indeed, the courts had placed their coercive power behind arbitration awards long before and the Steelworkers Trilogy made arbitration the darling of national labor policy. (MELTZER, Bernard D. Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration. The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Spring, 1967), p. 545-561 Disponível em <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1598847> Acesso em: 10 de dezembro de 2021). 

[2] Within the past few years, the United States Supreme Court VWT has handed down a number of decisions of great significance to the labor dispute arbitration process. Some have been concerned with problems of arbitrability or arbitral authority; others with the availability and exclusivity of the arbitration process visavis alternative legal remedies for breach of the labor agreement; and still others with the effect of a breach of obligation by one party to the labor agreement upon the obligations of the other party. We propose in this article to analyze these decisions, to attempt to categorize the different kinds of challenges to arbitral jurisdiction or authority which can be made, and to assess, in so far as this may be done, the import of the Court's decisions for the arbitration process. In a sense, we shall be dealing with the extent to which, under developing federal law, judicial review of the arbitration process is available. JONES, Russell A. Smith, and Dallas L. The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 5 (Mar., 1965), p. 751-808 Disponível <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1286507?origin=JSTOR-pdf> Acesso em: 09 de dezembro 2021.

[3] A realistic understanding of labor arbitration is nevertheless important. It helps to set a realistic agenda for reform because it reminds us that systems of dispute resolution can play only a limited role in affecting relationships that are shaped by powerful economic and social forces. Throughout labor relations there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of adjudication. Those who devise the rules and administer the process are the ones who are most likely to describe their work in print and to exaggerate its significance. Their roles are easier to study for legal scholars and political scientists than are the intricate processes of union organization, contract negotiation, and grievance settlement. This gives greater salience to the role of decisionmakers and helps create a body of partially informed opinion focusing on one part of a complex process. Labor arbitration has been particularly vulnerable to this problem. Much of the writing describing and evaluating it has come from practitioners whose professional egos are intertwined with the success of the process. In addition, prestigious groups such as the American Arbitration Association and the National Academy of Arbitration, through their publications, conferences, and reports, have acted as advocates for arbitration. Their literature has suggested that a clear line exists between arbitration and adjudication; it has also suggested that labor arbitration has been more successful in achieving industrial peace than any careful investigation suggests. In claiming success for labor arbitration, these groups have tended to overlook or downplay the crucial significance of union organizing and the collective-bargaining context. (GETMANT, Julius G. Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution. The Yale Law Journal, vol. 88, No. 5, Resolução de Disputas (abril de 1979), p. 916-949 Disponível em <https://www.jstor.org/stable/795823>. Acesso em: 08 de dezembro de 2021). 

[4] The trial court's decision vacating that award was affirmed by the Second Circuit on the following grounds: (1) The arbitrator had ignored the company's revocation of its past policy; that revocation had been excluded from arbitration by the narrow arbitration clause incorporated in the prior agreement and had, accordingly, been a matter for the company's discretion (2) The arbitrator, who had been barred by the governing agreement from adding to its terms, had ignored the fact that "labor contracts generally state affirmatively what conditions the parties agree to, more specifically, what restraints the parties will place on management's freedom of action" and had, consequently, erred in placing on the company the burden of securing the union's consent to the abandonment of the pre-existing policy (MELTZER, Bernard D. Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration. The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Spring, 1967), p. 545-561 Disponível em <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1598847> Acesso em: 10 de dezembrode 2021).