O caso Massachusetts v. EPA.

5. Conclusão

À luz deste precedente, incumbe à EPA: ou promover a efetiva regulação da emissão dos gases poluentes referidos na decisão; ou justificar adequadamente por que não exerce esta sua atribuição legal.

É relevante destacar que neste caso submetido à apreciação da Suprema Corte, in thesis, já existiriam razões suficientes a justificar a inércia da agência, argumento que efetivamente foi sustentado e rechaçado durante o julgamento.

Por isso, de um lado, é possível prever que, em princípio, a EPA realmente deveria se empenhar em regular a emissão de gases poluentes provenientes de veículos automotores novos. Esta expectativa justificar-se-ia pelo alcance e extensão do julgamento e pela força institucional atribuída naquele país aos precedentes judiciais, especialmente àqueles provenientes da Suprema Corte.

Todavia, seria plausível reconhecer que a influência e forte pressão exercidas pela potente indústria automobilística norte-americana poderiam minimizar a decisão prolatada pela Suprema Corte.

O principal ponto, por outro lado, relaciona-se ao tempo em que esta regulação específica deve ser promovida pela agência, na medida em que remanesce como discricionariedade da EPA decidir quando emitir ato normativo que pretenda regular os gases poluentes referidos no julgamento, ou ainda, apresentar nova justificativa para assim não proceder.

Notas

1. "The mission of the Environmental Protection Agency is to protect human health and the environment. Since 1970, EPA has been working for a cleaner, healthier environment for the American people" (Disponível em: <http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm#mission>. Acesso em: 21 ago. 2007).
2. Registre-se que: "Segundo o procurador-geral de Justiça de Nova York, Eliot Spitzer, os estados argumentaram que a manutenção dos atuais níveis de tolerância dos gases ‘contribui para a morte prematura, geração de doenças respiratórias crônicas e ataques de asma’. De acordo com ele, ‘esses níveis de poluição também levam a mais admissões hospitalares e aumento de gastos públicos com saúde" (TOGNOLLI, Claudio Julio. Ar puro: Suprema Corte manda EUA controlar emissão de carbono. Revista Consultor Jurídico, 03 abr. 2007).
3. Destaque-se que: "As indústrias dos Estados Unidos de veículos são responsáveis por 15% da emissão de gases que geram o efeito estufa, disse David Doniger, do Conselho Nacional de Defesa das Reservas" (TOGNOLLI, Claudio Julio. Ar puro: Suprema Corte manda EUA controlar emissão de carbono. Revista Consultor Jurídico, 03 abr. 2007).
4. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont e Washington.
5. District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City e Baltimore.
6. Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists e U. S. Public Interest Research Group.
7. Registre-se que: "Mais notadamente, a Califórnia é quem comandava a briga e tomou sozinha, por exemplo, a iniciativa de firmar acordo com a Grã-Bretanha para troca tecnológica para a redução dessas emissões. O estado da Califórnia também foi pioneiro em aprovar lei limitando a emissão de gases para cortar os atuais níveis em 25% até o ano de 2020" (TOGNOLLI, Claudio Julio. Ar puro: Suprema Corte manda EUA controlar emissão de carbono. Revista Consultor Jurídico, 03 abr. 2007).
8. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas e Utah.
9. Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile Dealers Association, Engine Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers Association, CO2 Litigation Group e Utility Air Regulatory Group.
10. Eis a redação do artigo III, que trata do Poder Judiciário: "Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; --to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; --to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; --to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; --to controversies between two or more states; --between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states; --between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed".
11. Alliance for Sustainable Communities, Applied Power Technologies, Inc., Bio Fuels America, The California Solar Energy Industries Assn., Clements Environmental Corp., Environmental Advocates, Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Friends of the Earth, Full Circle Energy Project, Inc., The Green Party of Rhode Island, Greenpeace USA, International Center for Technology Assessment, Network for Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ, New Jersey Environmental Watch, New Mexico Solar Energy Assn., Oregon Environmental Council, Public Citizen, Solar Energy Industries Assn. e The SUN DAY Campaign.
12. A EPA editou uma espécie de relatório (Federal Register; Vol. 68; N. 173/Monday, September 8th, 2003/Notices) explicando detalhadamente porque negou o requerimento das organizações privadas. Nele constam os seguintes trechos: "SUMMARY: A group of organizations petitioned EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. For the reasons set forth in this notice, EPA is denying the petition." "Beyond issues of authority and interference with fuel economy standards, EPA disagrees with the regulatory approach urged by petitioners. We agree with the President that ‘we must address the issue of global climate change’ (February 14, 2002). We do not believe, however, that it would be either effective or appropriate for EPA to establish GHG standards for motor vehicles at this time. As described in detail below, the President has laid out a comprehensive approach to climate change that calls for near-term voluntary actions and incentives along with programs aimed at reducing scientific uncertainties and encouraging technological development so that the government may effectively and efficiently address the climate change issue over the long term" (Disponível em: <http://www.icta.org/doc/68FedReg52922PetDenial.pdf>. Acesso em: 21 ago. 2007).
13. Eis a dicção do dispositivo: "Sec. 202. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b)- (1) The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful life (as determined under subsection (d), relating to useful life of vehicles for purposes of certification), whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution".
14. O voto do Ministro Stevens foi acompanhado pelos Ministros Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg e Breyer. O Presidente Roberts e o Ministro Scalia votaram em sentido contrário à maioria, por fundamentos distintos, e ambos foram acompanhados também pelos Ministros Thomas e Alito. Em síntese, o resultado do julgamento foi 5x4(x2).
15. "The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized".
16. "According to the climate scientist Michael MacCracken, ‘qualified scientific experts involved in climate change research’ have reached a ‘strong consensus’ that global warming threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century, ‘severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,’ a ‘significant reduction in water storage in winter snowpack in mountainous regions with direct and important economic consequences,’ and an increase in the spread of disease. He also observes that rising ocean temperatures may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes".
17. "That these climate-change risks are "widely shared" does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation".
18. "While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it".
19. "The Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes ‘any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical … substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air … .’ On its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word ‘any.’ Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt ‘physical [and] chemical … substance[s] which [are] emitted into … the ambient air.’ The statute is unambiguous".
20. "In short, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore ‘arbitrary, capricious, … or otherwise not in accordance with law’".
21. . "This Court’s standing jurisprudence simply recognizes that redress of grievances of the sort at issue here ‘is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,’ not the federal courts".
22. "The Court asserts that Massachusetts is entitled to ‘special solicitude’ due to its ‘quasi-sovereign interests’, but then applies our Article III standing test to the asserted injury of the State’s loss of coastal property".
23. "But the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for petitioners’ failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability".
24. "The Court ignores the complexities of global warming, and does so by now disregarding the "particularized" injury it relied on in step one, and using the dire nature of global warming itself as a bootstrap for finding causation and redressability." "Petitioners are never able to trace their alleged injuries back through this complex web to the fractional amount of global emissions that might have been limited with EPA standards".
25. No original: "The good news is that the Court’s ‘special solicitude’ for Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted standing requirements applied in this case. The bad news is that the Court’s self-professed relaxation of those Article III requirements has caused us to transgress ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society".
26. "I join the Chief Justice´s opinion in full, and would hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide this case because petitioners lack standing".
27. "The Administrator is precluded from concluding for other reasons ‘that it would … be better not to regulate at this time.’ Such other reasons—perfectly valid reasons—were set forth in the agency’s statement".
28. "The Court dismisses this analysis as ‘rest[ing] on reasoning divorced from the statutory text".
29. "When the Administrator makes a judgment whether to regulate greenhouse gases, that judgment must relate to whether they are air pollutants that ‘cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare".
30. "But the statute says nothing at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment—the permissible reasons for deciding not to grapple with the issue at the present time".
31. "Thus, the various ‘policy’ rationales, ante, at 31, that the Court criticizes are not ‘divorced from the statutory text’ ante, at 30, except in the sense that the statutory text is silent, as texts are often silent about permissible reasons for the exercise of agency discretion".
32. "The reasons the EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly take into account (and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to consider entering a new field: the impact such entry would have on other Executive Branch programs and on foreign policy".
33. "There is no basis in law for the Court’s imposed limitation".
34. "The Court’s analysis faithfully follows the argument advanced by petitioners, which focuses on the word "including" in the statutory definition of ‘air pollutant".
35. "The Court simply pretends this half of the definition does not exist".
36. "In short, the word ‘including’ does not require the Court’s (or the petitioners’) result. It is perfectly reasonable to view the definition of ‘air pollutant’ in its entirety: An air pollutant can be ‘any physical, chemical,…substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air,’ but only if it retains the general characteristic of being an ‘air pollution agent or combination of such agents".
37. "The Court’s alarm over global warming may or may not be justified, but it ought not distort the outcome of this litigation".
38. "No matter how important the underlying policy issues at stake, this Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency".
39. Por exemplo: TOGNOLLI, Claudio Julio. Ar puro: Suprema Corte manda EUA controlar emissão de carbono. Revista Consultor Jurídico, 03 abr. 2007; VALOR ECONÔMICO. Suprema Corte reprova política ambiental de Bush. Valor Econômico, 03 abr. 2007.
40. WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 1-17 (Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
41. A ordem foi invertida de acordo com o interesse para o presente trabalho. No original: "So wherein lies the true significance of the case? We believe that the long-term significance of the case is likely to be the opinion’s impact on two doctrinal areas of the law: (1) the standing of states; and (2) the standard of review applied to denials of petitions for rulemaking. First, although we have some questions about the Court’s reasoning, we are encouraged to see the beginning of a framework for evaluating state standing based on the interest of the state in the litigation. Second, with respect to judicial review of agency inaction in the rulemaking context, the Court’s decision breaks new ground by not only confirming the reviewability of an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition but also by closely scrutinizing the reasons that the EPA offered for its decision to decline to regulate" (WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 2. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
42. "What we find surprising, however, is the level of scrutiny that the Court applied when reviewing the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate. To be sure, the Court articulated a verbal formula that sounds quite con-strained: refusals to promulgate rules are susceptible only to "extremely limited" and "highly deferential" review. The Court’s actual review of the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate, however, was meticulous and probing—a far cry from what one would expect of "highly deferential" review"
(WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 12. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
43. WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 17. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007.
44. "States are left in a relatively powerful position vis-à-vis federal agencies in terms of their ability both to file suits against agencies and to seek fairly exacting judicial review of the agency’s reasons for declining to regulate" (WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 17. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
45. "Unlike Professors Watts and Wildermuth, I do not find the Massachusetts majority’s review of the EPA’s action to be particularly searching or severe—let alone "meticulous and probing."28 Nor is it at odds with the D.C. Circuit standard embraced by the Supreme Court. The Massachusetts majority did not scrutinize or second-guess the EPA’s articulated reasons for refusing to regulate so much as it held that the EPA’s reasons were im-permissible under the Clean Air Act. The Court did not conclude that the EPA was wrong in asserting that new vehicle emission standards were im-practical or inefficient, or that a rulemaking could conflict with efforts to forge international action on climate change. Such rationales, according to the Court, simply could not justify a refusal to regulate because they were divorced from the relevant statutory text" (ADLER, Jonathan H. Massachusetts v. EPA heats up climate policy no less than administrative law: a comment on professors Watts and Wildermuth. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 36. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
46. Nas palavras de Jonathan H. Adler: "Massachusetts v. EPA is easily the Supreme Court’s most important environmental law decision in well over a decade" (ADLER, Jonathan H. Massachusetts v. EPA heats up climate policy no less than administrative law: a comment on professors Watts and Wildermuth. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 32. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).
47. "As a practical matter it will take years for the EPA to comply with the Court’s judgment, and years more for additional litigation to force the EPA’s hand" (ADLER, Jonathan H. Massachusetts v. EPA heats up climate policy no less than administrative law: a comment on professors Watts and Wildermuth. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 32-41. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).

Bibliografia

ADLER, Jonathan H. Massachusetts v. EPA heats up climate policy no less than administrative law: a comment on professors Watts and Wildermuth. Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. Massachusetts v. EPA. Disponível em:<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-1120.ZS.html>. Acesso em: 21 ago. 2007.

TOGNOLLI, Claudio Julio. Ar puro: Suprema Corte manda EUA controlar emissão de carbono. Revista Consultor Jurídico, 03 abr. 2007.

VALOR ECONÔMICO. Suprema Corte reprova política ambiental de Bush. Valor Econômico, 03 abr. 2007.

WATTS, Kathryn A.; WILDERMUTH, Amy J. Massachusetts v. EPA: breaking new ground on issues other than global warming. Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, vol. 102, p. 1-17 (Disponível em: <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ lawreview/colloquy/2007/17/>. Acesso em: 23 ago. 2007).