3. Conclusão
Por todo o exposto, espera-se ter restado demonstrada a construção jurisprudencial, pela Suprema Corte norteamericana, do right to privacy, que somente pode ser limitado quando haja um interesse estatal coercivo a ser protegido pela lei que, supostamente, violaria a intimidade dos cidadãos.
Ademais, espera-se tenha ficado clara a adequação da noção do direito à privacidade, como uma esfera de liberdade individual intangível ao poder regulamentar do Estado, ao sistema constitucional brasileiro, com especial atenção ao espírito da Carta de 1988, que procurou romper com o Estado policialesco e autoritário vigente antes de sua promulgação, não mais havendo espaço, no Brasil atual, para intromissões abusivas do governo na vida dos cidadãos.
É nesse âmbito que o direito à privacidade, na acepção que lhe foi dada pela corte constitucional norteamericana, pode ter importante papel no Direito brasileiro, como já vem tendo, inclusive, nas lições de alguns autores nacionais, seja pela inconstitucionalidade da lei que faz da vadiagem contravenção, seja pela interpretação conforme a Constituição da Lei de Falências.
Ao reconhecer-se o direito à privacidade como uma esfera de liberdade individual, destaca-se o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal de proteger a Constituição e, por via de consequência, o Estado Democrático brasileiro, das intrusões abusivas dos próprios representantes eleitos pelo povo. Esse papel de corte constitucional, que o STF cada vez mais exerce, seja por meio da repercussão geral, seja através dos processos objetivos (ADINs, ADCs e etc.), deve ser administrado com cautela, nos limites da legitimidade do Poder Judiciário.
Por assim ser, o direito à privacidade, como esfera de liberdade individual livre da regulação estatal, pode ser baliza importante para a defesa da ordem constitucional brasileira, especialmente pelo STF, cujo papel deve ser o de resguardar o processo democrático e de promover os valores constitucionais.[33]
Referências
ALEXY, Robert. Teoria de los Derechos Fundamentales. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993.
BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Interpretação e Apicação da Constituição. Fundamentos de uma Dogmática Constitucional Transformadora. 5ª Ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2003.
___________________. Vinte anos da Constituição Brasileira de 1988: a que Estado Chegamos. In: As Constituições brasileiras: notícia, história e análise crítica. Brasília: OAB, 2008.
BELTRÃO, Sílvio Romero. Direito da personalidade à intimidade. Disponível em: http://www.tjpe.gov.br/cej/revistas/num1/cap09.pdf. Acesso: 25/06/2011.
BONAVIDES, Paulo. Curso de Direito Constitucional. 24ª Edição. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009.
CARRAZZA, Roque Antonio. Curso de Direito Constitucional Tributário. 27ª Ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011.
COELHO, Fábio Ulhoa. Curso de Direito Comercial. V-3. 14ª Edição. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010.
DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard, 1979.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (02-102) 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
MARSHAL, Thurgood. Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. In: MURPHY, Walter F.; PRITCHETT, C Herman; EPSTEIN, Lee; KNIGHT, Jack. Courts, Judges and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process. 6a Ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2006.
NUCCI, Guilherme de Souza. Manual de Processo e Execução Penal. 6ª Edição. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2010.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PA. v. CASEY (91-744), 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
SILVA, Edson Ferreira da. Direito à Intimidade. São Paulo: Oliveira Mendes, 1998.
Notas
[1] BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Interpretação e Apicação da Constituição. Fundamentos de uma Dogmática Constitucional Transformadora. 5ª Ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2003. P. 327.
[2] CARRAZZA, Roque Antonio. Curso de Direito Constitucional Tributário. 27ª Ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2011. P. 55.
[3]SILVA, Edson Ferreira da. Direito à Intimidade. São Paulo: Oliveira Mendes, 1998. p. 131.
[4]BELTRÃO, Sílvio Romero. Direito da personalidade à intimidade. Disponível em: http://www.tjpe.gov.br/cej/revistas/num1/cap09.pdf. Acesso: 25/06/2011. p. 6-8.
[5] Capítulo II do Livro I: Das pessoas.
[6] BELTRÃO, Sílvio Romero. Op. Cit. p. 17-20.
[7] BONAVIDES, Paulo. Curso de Direito Constitucional. 24ª Edição. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2009. p. 91.
[8] É essa a terminologia utilizada para referir-se aos magistrados que compõem a Suprema Corte dos EUA.
[9] Os autores da Constituição de 1787.
[10] “When contemporary Americans cite ‘The Constitution’, they invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the Framers barely began to construct two centuries ago”. MARSHAL, Thurgood. Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. In: MURPHY, Walter F.; PRITCHETT, C Herman; EPSTEIN, Lee; KNIGHT, Jack. Courts, Judges and Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process. 6a Ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2006. p. 580.
[11] “The men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 could not have envisioned these changes. They could not have imagined, nor would have accepted, that the document they were drafting would one day be construed by a Supreme Court to which have been appointed a woman and a descendent of African slave”. Idem. p. 582.
[12] GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[13] “This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.”
[14] “The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 ) and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wieman v. Updegraff,344 U.S. 183, 195 ) - indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249 -250, 261-263; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369 . Without [381 U.S. 479, 483] those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.”
[15] “Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.’”
[16] ROE v. WADE, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[17] “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.”
[18] “The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.”
[19] “With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that, until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
(…)
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated.”
[20] “Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”
[21] “With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion [410 U.S. 113, 164] during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”
[22] LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (02-102) 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
[23] “The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”
[24] “Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”
[25] “The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.” Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”
[26] Art. 59. Entregar-se alguem habitualmente à ociosidade, sendo válido para o trabalho, sem ter renda que lhe assegure meios bastantes de subsistência, ou prover à própria subsistência mediante ocupação ilícita:
Pena – prisão simples, de quinze dias a três meses.
Parágrafo único. A aquisição superveniente de renda, que assegure ao condenado meios bastantes de subsistência, extingue a pena.
[27] NUCCI, Guilherme de Souza. Manual de Processo e Execução Penal. 6ª Edição. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2010. p. 607.
[28] COELHO, Fábio Ulhoa. Curso de Direito Comercial. Volume III. 14 ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2010. p. 436.
[29] “Rather, the adjudication of substantive due process claims may require this Court to exercise its reasoned judgment in determining the boundaries between the individual's liberty and the demands of organized society.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (91-744), 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
[30] Robert Alexy afirma: “As colisões de direitos fundamentais acima mencionadas devem ser consideradas, segundo a teoria dos princípios, como uma colisão de princípios”. Apud. BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Interpretação e Aplicação da Constituição. Fundamentos de uma Dogmática Constitucional Transformadora. 5ª Ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2003. P. 330, Nota de Rodapé 62.
[31] DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard, 1979. p. 24-26
[32] ALEXY, Robert. Teoria de los Derechos Fundamentales. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993. p. 111-115
[33] BARROSO, Luís Roberto. Vinte anos da Constituição Brasileira de 1988: a que Estado Chegamos. In: As Constituições brasileiras: notícia, história e análise crítica. Brasília: OAB, 2008. p. 154
Abstract: Beginning with a brief explanation about the traditional acceptation of the right to privacy, affirmed in article 5, X, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, the present article aims to demonstrate a broader concept of this right, judicially built by the Unites States Supreme Court, as a true individual sphere of liberty, free from governmental intrusions. For such purpose, three landmark cases decided by the USSC, in which the court deduced the existence of a right to privacy and set its boundaries, will be analyzed. The article aims to demonstrate, finally, that this notion is applicable to the Brazilian legal system and is also known to national Law authors.
Key-words: Right to privacy. Concept. United States Supreme Court. Boudaries.
